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Comparative Theology, Comparative Religion, and
Hindu-Christian Studies: Ethnography as Method
Kristin Bloomer
University of Hawaii
CONCERNS that likely inspired today's panel
can be traced textually to the beginnings of
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and to the
earliest writings of what we now call Hinduism.
In the field of Hindu-Christian studies, these
concerns suggest ethnographic approaches that
are not in themselves new, but which borrow in
potentially new ways from the methodological
tool-boxes of anthropology, theology and the
history of religions.
A quick perusal of academic journal entries
over the past twenty years shows growing
attention to questions such as "What is
comparative theology?" and "What is the
comparative study of religion?" (These broad
questions suggest a sub-question, the topic of
this panel: "What is Hindu-Christian Studies,
and how best might we do it?") Reasons for the
growing attention to such questions about
comparison are multiple. They include the
pressures of globalization and, with them, a
growing market-academic" and popular-for
studies and stories that deal with phenomena
related to globalization. Other reasons include a
healthy self-doubt that has arisen generally in
the humanities, particularly in the study of
religion among theologians and historians of
religion. This self-consciousness arises from at
least four comers: the loss of objectivity that has
accompanied postmodernism; a post-colonial
anxiety regarding the study of non-Western
religions; a post-Enlightenment concern about
whether theology, in particular, can or should be
considered an academic discipline at all, housed
under the same roof as other, more "scientific"

disciplines; and some confusion over attempts to
understand the boundaries of religion itself,
partiCUlarly since Talal Asad's critique of
Clifford Geertz, l a matter I will explore shortly.
F or these and other reasons, both theologians
(Christian theologians in particular) and
comparativists have been worrying over who
they are, what they are doing, and how they can
be responsibly more responsive to the ever"more-impressive fact of religious plurality.
Before trying to take a stab, first, at defining
"what" comparative theology might mean today,
I want to try to understand it historicallyparticularly since I agree with Asad that the
concept "religion" exists only as a historical
construct/ as does "comparative theology,"
"comparative
religion,"
"Hindu-Christian
studies," or any term for that matter. Which
practices and concepts we subsume under
"religion," or "theology" or "comparative
theology" depends, of course, on our theories,
our experience, our worldviews-all of which
are shaped by discursive processes and events of
history. To understand something about the
history of comparative theology, then, will help
us see: first, how it, like any other term or
practice, is a historical product of discursive
processes; how, as such a,product, it is open to
the force of change; and how theologians and
scholars of religion-themselves discursive
subj ects working within the process of such
change, conditioned by the limits of its history
and the perceived needs of the moment-can
best correlate their work to these needs while
trying to maintain a sense of integrity.
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In a 1987 Encyclopedia of Religion article
under the heading "Theology: Comparative
Theology," David Tracy points out that although
the work of comparative religion goes back to
our very beginnings as humans-at least as far
back as the moment when the first worshipper of
a god or gods asked herself why her neighbor is
a worshipper of some other god or godscomparative work of any sustained scholarly
fashion goes back, in traditional Western
theologies and philosophies, at least as far as the
beginnings of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 3
Among other traditions, especially in India,
Tracy points out, the scholarly work of religious
comparison has been going on much longer still
and with great philosophical sophistication
(Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian
Philosophy, 5 vols., Cambridge, 1922-1955).
Despite the rich history of philosophical and
theological scholarly work in India and the
vibrant theological work being carried out there
as well as in other countries and traditions, one
of the greatest problems with the term
"theology" today is that it is still generally
assumed to mean "Christian, Western theology,"
at least within the confines of the Western
academy. For the purposes of this paper, both
because of and in spite of this tendency-and for
reasons of space-I will focus on the history of
comparison within Christianity. Furthermore,
while theologies of Islam, Hinduism and
Buddhism (though some Buddhist philosophical
treatises might better be described as atheologies) have contributed significantly to the
formation of Christian theologies, it is Christian
theology that has most directly influenced the
forination of the academic study of religion in
the so-called West.
While the term "comparative theology" has
received a fair amount of cache in recent years,
Christian theology, I would argue (along with
others such as David Tracy, Keith Ward, Francis
X .. Clooney, Eric Sharpe), has always been
comparative.
Furthermore, it has always
struggled to define itself in relation to other
disciplines, and with the notion of how
scientifically or normatively neutral it can or
should be.
Tracy reminds us in his
Encyclopedia of Religion entry that while the
term "comparative theology" was not used in the
premodern period, comparative elements-that
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is, reflection on "other religions"-have been
present in the Christian tradition since its
beginnings, both in the philosophical traditions
of Greece and Rome and in the Hebrew
traditions of ancient Israel. These comparative
elements can be traced in leanings both positive
(in terms of borrowing) and negative
(exclusivism, tendencies to demonize).4
The emergence of the very notion of religion
in Europe, furthermore, has been outlined by
Talal Asad, Eric Sharpe, .and Samuel J. Preus,
whose book Explaining Religion: Criticism and
Theory from Bodin to Freud traces a narrative of
displacement in which religion as it is studied in
the human sciences is increasingly separated
from theology. Denying the possibility of
transcendence arid replacing it with a naturalistic
paradigm, scholars of religion increasingly
adopted a critical outlook towards their object of
study and removed from it any appeal to a
transcendent God. Key players in this paradigm
shift as Preus lists them are Bernard Fontenelle,
David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich
Schleiermacher, Emile Durkheim, E.B. Tylor,
and Sigmund Freud, among others.
Of these men, Schleiermacher, a Reformed
theologian, is particularly key to the
development of the study of religion as a human
science-or particularly, at least, for theology.
Theologians such as Keith WardS, James
Fredericks 6 and others have pointed out the
extent of Schleiermacher's influence on the
contemporary, comparative study of religion,
particularly on liberal theology and its claim to a
universal
religious
experience.
Schleiermacher's apparent appeal to a universal
core linking together all religions, first (On
Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers,
1799) in the sense of an intuition, sense or
feeling of the infinite/ and in later writings
(Glaubenslehre, or The Christian Faith, 1821)
as a feeling of absolute dependence, 8 has been
used as a basis for arguing for the
"transcendental unity" of all religions-an
argument which has been shown to be highly
problematic. Nonetheless, this transcendental
unity has served, as a cornerstone for much
modem thought about religion and can be seen
in works of authors including Rudolph Otto,
Ernst Troeltsch, Mircea Eliade, Bernard
Lonergan, Huston Smith, Wilfred Cantwell
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Smith, and John Hick, among many others. It is
an argument appreciable for its contribution to
the comparative study of religions in its stress on
similarity (without which one cannot do
comparison), but one also which is due
refutation, along with many other contemporary
scholars of religion, for failing properly to
recognize distinction.
About half a century after Schleiermacher
"comparative
published Glaubenslehre,
religion," or what came to be known as the
historical, critical and comparative study of
religions of the world, .came into wide public
attention. This coincided, in the l860s and 70s,
with the rise of empiricism and the new "science
of religion.,,9
Friedrich Max Muller, the
expatriate German philologist and man of letters,
famously introduced the discipline "Science of
Religion" on February 19, 1870 in an address to
the Royal Institution in London. This "science,"
as opposed to the "science of theology" outlined
by Thomas Aquinas half a millenium earlier,
was to be significantly different from theology.
Notably, Muller did not use the terms
"theology" or "comparative theology" anywhere
in his address. Rather, his use of the word
"science" seemed to suggest a study of religion
that would analyze historical forms of religion
as opposed to theoretic theology, which Tracy
defines as an analysis of the philosophical
conditions of the possibility for a religion. 10 The
work of David Hume or G.W.F. Hegel would
exemplify the latter type of theology.ll
Alternately, in 1871, on the heels of Muller's
address, James Freeman Clarke published Ten
Great Religions: An Essay in Comparative
Theology, which concentrated on the history of
religious doctrines in different traditions.
A scholar attempting to do comparative
theology from within a historical approach - that
is to say, from within a history of religions
approach - may still theorize a systematic metastructure through which she analyzes two or
more religions. One difference between her and
a theoretical theologian or a theologian of
religion(s), however, is that she, the historian,
may be more inclined to work without making
her (sometimes latent) religious or a-religious
standpoint explicit, or without necessarily
revealing the religious underpinnings of her
supposedly neutral hermeneutical categories-

Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2008

though she may acknowledge her intellectual
debts to preceding scholars of religion or locate
herself in a particular school of scientific
thought
(anthropological,
sociological,
psychological, etc.).
The hermeneutic or
methodological categories employed by the
comparativist working from a history of
religions approach may, like those employed by
the comparativist working from within a
theology of religion(s), encourage the judgment
of one religion as lacking in relation to another,
as less "doctrinally developed," for example, or
as less symbolically rich. The categories she
employs may leave certain forms of religion
outside the field of comparison altogether.
The most recent, famous example
highlighting the potential.blind spots of such an
approach was outlined by Asad in his critique of
Geertz's definition of religion as a cultural
system. 12 In a one-two-three combo punch, Asad
first
criticized Geertz for unwittingly
constructing his definition out of features
bearing an uncanny likeness to his own culturalreligious
background
(the jab:
white
Protestantism). Second, he critiqued Geertz for
projecting
a
distinctly
modem,
postEnlightenment bias regarding the ess"ential
nature of religion as something separate,
distinguishable or able to be teased out from
other aspects of life-such as aesthetics, history,
science, the quotidian. Third, he revealed some
of the historical shifts and discursive processes
that have contributed to the production of our
concept of religion as a trans-historical essence.
Asad explored the processes by which this
concept came to seem natural, through the
effects of discipline and power in medieval
Christianity and Islam. "My argument," Asad
wrote, "is that there cannot be a universal
definition of religion, not only because its
constituent elements and relationships are
historically specific, but because that definition
is itself the historical product of discursive
processes.,,13 If this was true, many scholars of
religion were down for the count.
Though perhaps not the full count.
Many scholars mulled, while lying on their
backs: How do I proceed without universal
defmitions?-and got up again. Bruce Lincoln,
in his Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion
After September 11, commented that while the
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second part of Asad's above statement was
"wonderfully insightful," the reasons for the
absolute prohibition in the fIrst part-that there
cannot be a universal defInition of religionwere not entirely clear. "Is not all language 'the
historical product of discursive processes?"
Lincoln asked. 14 That this is the case "hardly
renders futile all attempts at defmition,
... particularly when one understands these as
provisional attempts to clarify one's thought, not
to capture the innate essence of things.,,15 In
other words, a defInition or a methodology
based on proposed universals may be useful to
forward a position from a particular
standpoint-and then, perhaps, to move on to
another position.
Despite some of the working benefIts of
forthrightly assuming an underlying unity of
religious experience-including the benefIt of
providing a common ground for discussion that
can encourage interreligious dialogue-the
analytical disadvantages are, I believe, more
signifIcant. Asserting a unifIed fIeld of religious
experience can actually discourage dialogue and
corrode critical scholarship. Other problems
include the promotion of a subtle (or not-sosubtle) theological and/or political imperialism,
or the support of an uncritical syncretism that
obscures real differences. In response to these
problems I agree with Fredericks, who pits his
own defInition of a proper way to do
comparative theology against a liberal theology
of religions, arguing that comparative theology
must deal responsively and creatively with the
plurality of religions, as opposed to a
comprehensive theology of non-Christian
religions based on an appeal to universal
religious experience.
On the other hand, I want to avoid the
extreme reaction to liberal theology as offered
by the cultural-linguistic position advocated by
George Lindbeck and other "postliberal
Lindbeck's position, which
theologians."
explicitly draws on the semiotic anthropology of
Clifford Geertz, proposes that religion is a like a
language, with its own rules of grammar, that
forms a perceptual and conceptual framework
for shaping subjectivities. The grammar of this
religion, Lindbeck argues, is doctrine. Doctrines
change, Lindbeck asserts, not as a result of new
experiences that spring ex nihilo out of a
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol21/iss1/10
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changing autonomous subject, but as a result of
the interactions of a cultural-linguistic system
with changing situations. Religious traditions
are transformed when a religious interpretive
scheme develops anomalies as it is applied in
new historical or cultural contexts. 16
The
experiential-expressivist
model
forwarded by liberal theologians-called such
because of its roots in the idea that all religion is
the expression of a shared, underlying
experience-suggests that "the various religions
are diverse symbolizations of one and the same
core experience of the Ultimate, and that
therefore they must respect one another, learn
from one another, and reciprocally enrich one
another.,,17 The cultural-linguistic model, on the
other hand; 'locuses on particular religions as
separate language systems. These systems may
perchance be commensurable-their doctrinal
similarities may happen to overlap in placesbut as a whole they are not various expressions
of a shared, unifIed core experience. Rather, the
cultural linguistic model "stresses the degree to
which human experience is shaped, molded, and
in a sense constituted by cultural and linguistic
forms.,,18 As a result, adherents of different
religions do not diversely thematize the same
experience; they have different experiences. 19
The advantages of such a model-cultural
particularity, historical specifIcity, analytical
precision, agreement with recent theories of
language-are evidenced by the scholarly
ascendancy the model has enjoyed among
historians, anthropologists, sociologists and
philosophers.
The disadvantages, however,
remain signifIcant. How can a person who has
been trained to embody the skills of one
particular religion via its doctrinal rules ever
truly understand the embodied skills of another?
Even if this is possible, the idea that each
religion constitutes a world of its own and
uniquely forms human experience might make
theologians confronted with the daunting task of
navigating a new world feel safer turning
inward, into the world of their home religion.
They might turn to ecumenical dialogue-if the
theologian is Christ~an, say, to dialogue between
Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox
Christians-rather than to inter-religious
dialogue or comparison, say, with Hindus or
Hinduism. While such dialogue and comparison
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might happen ad hoc, and while points of
intersection between religions may indeed be
found to exist in these moments, the job of the
theologian working under such a model is not
thought to be one of inter-religious comparison.
A cultural-linguistic model generally functions
"intratextually," that is, within its own
interpretive framework. Christians, according to
this scheme, end up talking mainly to
themselves.· The same goes for Buddhists or
Hindus, etc.
While I am drawn to this cultural-linguistic
model for its attention to cultural and doctrinal
specificity, I am concerned about the
implications of its most extreme versions for
inter-religious dialogue, scholarly understanding
and comparison. At the same time, the model
offers a helpful tool to avoid an equally
dangerous liberal approach that suggests one
unified, universal experience of religion.
One way out of the quandary of trying to
understand the religion of the Other is to limit
the scope of one's project, slow way down, and
take serious stock. Scholars may suggest, along
with Fredericks, Francis X. Clooney, S.J., and
others trained within the Chicago history of
religions tradition, that all academic exercises
are tentative, and that comparative experiments
may lead to particularly "limited, very tentative
results. ,,20 Instead of offering encompassing
theological theories based on claims for or
against a universal religious experience,
Fredericks suggests that the comparative
theologian engage in "limited case studies in
which specific elements of the Christian
tradition are interpreted in comparison with
elements of another religious tradition.,,21 He
bases this suggestion on the belief that a fully
systematized theology of non-Christian religions
is not possible.
I am drawn to Fredericks' notion of limited
case studies, as well as to another interpretation
of the term "comparative theology" forwarded
by Clooney - with a twist. Clooney's approach
could be seen to merge both uses of
"comparative theology" noted by Tracy-that
which might be considered part of the history of
religions approach, and that which might be
called explicitly theological. Clooney calls for
"a truly constructive theology ... distinguished
by its SOU1;ces and ways of proceeding, by its
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foundation in more than one tradition ... and by
reflection which builds on that foundation, rather
than simply on themes or by methods. already
articulated prior to the comparative practice.,,22
This third type of theology, Clooney argues, is
"a theology deeply changed by its attention to
the details of multiple religious and theological
traditions; it is a theology that occurs truly only
after comparison. ,,23
But not entirely after, I would' argue.
"After," while gesturing in the right direction,
suggests a stopping point for comparison,
following which the theological task begins.
Clooney acknowledges in theory that this is true,
but that there is "no time limit, no boundary
marker" necessitated by the word "after:"
'" After' also implies consequence, 'in
accordance with,'" and may also suggest an ongoing q~ality to the work of comparison,
Clooney writes. 24 Perhaps, then, we might
acknowledge the existence of "an everevolving" theology or standpoint in relation to
notions of divinity, transcendence, and the
metaphysical - a theological standpoint that is
modified and brought into existence only
through dialogical study. This dialogue occurs
only in relation-not only between real scholars
but also between real people living in real,
specific, historical situations. We are now
beginning to point toward ethnography.
One might infer from Clooney's stress on
"the constructive" element of the project that the
difference is one of identity as well as audience:
whereas an historian of religion could see herself
contributing to
(and
therefore
acting
constructively toward) the field of history, the
theologian could see herself as standing in the
stream of a particular way of talking about
divinity, or god(s), or ultimate reality-even if
she herself makes no appeal to the existence of a
transcendental being beyond this stream of talk.
She may seek to inquire into the ways selves (or,
in certain cases, no-selves) are created and
molded by the words, concepts and practices of
their home tradition. As she compares this home
world with other cultural-linguistic worlds, or
with various expressions of her own tradition in
various historical and cultural moments, she may
inquire into how, if at all, other selves (or noselves, for the term "self' is a particularly
Western one) are molded differently. She may
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see herself as standing in the stream of a
particular religious tradition that she considers
home-though she may travel in search of new
analytic tools and hermeneutic horizons, with an
awareness that the language of home is
sometimes lacking. She may understand herself
to be speaking primarily to those who identify
with that home tradition, perhaps to those who
feel restless within it, or to those few who pay
attention to the work of scholars of religionwhether those' people are academics or people
trying to make sense of their own and others'
lives. She may rely heavily upon the tools of
history of religion(s) or area studies, and may
seek to change a small public's understanding of
home andlor foreign traditions via these tools.
She may refrain from making appeals to the
existence of a transcendent being; she may talk
more about the humans who engage in god-talk
than in talk about a god or gods. In the end, her
position may be more one of advocacy than one
of neutrality or pretended neutrality-advocacy
for change in the academy, or for a wider
awareness regarding difference and similarity at
,home.
It is this, third sort of comparative
theology-a constructive sort as defined by
Clooney, with valences of Tracy's first model
within the history of religions-that appeals to
me most. This sort of comparative work, I
believe, has the potential to be most creative in
its openness to a variety of traditions, to the
possibility of changing not only the lens through
which one looks at those traditions, but also to
the possibility of changing the lens through
which one looks back at the home tradition. It
points, finally, to a form of theological and
intellectual practice in which the subject
performing the task of scholarship is explicitly
open to change resulting from that study.

The "how:" methods
While this third, constructive approach
seems to me best in describing the "what" of
comparative theology (particularly if we view it
as building on the approach most indebted to the
history of religions), I would at the same time
distinguish my methods from the type of
comparative theology that has been so
productively forwarded by Clooney. For one
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol21/iss1/10
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thing, while recognizing the constructed, fluid
nature of cultures and traditions, Clooney
confines his work to traditions as defined by
texts. Second, I want to push the boundaries of
fairly simple notions of comparison that rely on
the idea of traditions as discrete entities rather
than cultural negotiations with syncretic
characteristics, negotiations that are fluid,
changing, pelmeable, informed by one another. I
am less inclined, for example, to compare texts
from two different traditions, A and B, rather
than look at how each text is a complicated
construction of, say, Acd or Bqj, or Ab and Ba.
How has A been constructed in part through
interaction with B, andlor with readers or
devotees of B? What are the implications of
such considerations for comparative theology?
Furthermore, while during the past ten. to
fifteen years, scholars have produced an
increasing number of studies that may be labeled
"comparative theology," nearly all the work
being done in that area-studies not only by
Clooney but also David Burrell, Joseph Bracken,
Jacques Dupuis, Mark Heim and Keith Ward,
for example-falls into the category of
systematic or philosophical theology. Using only
philosophical or systematic theological methods
for a project in comparative theology presents
many problems. First, it fails properly to address
those oral or poetic traditions that deal not in the
written word or in logical argument, but ~
speech, song, narrative, metaphorical language
andlor myth (though Clooney has done this).
Second, it fails to consider the role of practice in
religion, particularly by practitioners who are
unaware of or uninterested in doctrine, or who
actively participate in traditions that have no
explicit doctrine.
If neither philosophical nor systematic
theology necessarily serves as the best method
for comparative theological work, which
subdisciplines or methods do? And still, even if
we choose ethnography, how do we avoid the
pitfalls of universalism on the one hand, and, on
the other, of getting so caught up in differences
or radical particularizing that we make
comparison imposs,ible?
With regards to the latter problem, Wendy
Doniger suggests a method constructed from the
bottom up-that is, one which "assumes certain
continuities not about overarching human

6

Bloomer: Comparative Theology, Comparative Religion, and Hindu-Christian Studies: Ethnography as Method

Comparative Theology, Comparative Religion 39
universals but about particular narrative details
concerning the body, sexual desire, procreation,
parenting, pain, and death, details which, though
unable to avoid mediation by culture entirely,
are at least less culturally mediated than the
broader
conceptual
categories
of the
universalists.,,25 Working around these bodily
points, Doniger continues, the scholar working
from the bottom up will "lean more heavily on
data, informed, even inspired though she may be
by theory; she begins with a thorough historical
study and then goes back to make it
comparative.,,26 While the scholar will be
limited by the confines of her own linguistic and
cultural background, she will try to master the
language(s) of the other and pay attention to her
sources on their own terms, in all their
complexity, before she pays attention to a
particular rubric or meta-narrative for
interpretation. She will not work from the top
down, as from a "transcendental concept" of
religion, nor from some universalist theory of
religion, but from the ground up: from what the
texts andlor people in the field say.
The
scholar's own culture and life experiences will
influence her interests and motivating ideawhat Doniger calls the "third side" of the
triangle, with the other two emanating from the
two traditions or situations being compared-but
that idea will lead her back to the texts, or to the
field, "where she may find unexpected details
that will in turn modify the idea she is looking
for.,,27
Obviously, one cannot simply jump into a
text or the field and receive, as. if through
osmosis or revelation, knowledge of data "on its
own terms" or of things "as they are." One will
always be interpreting. Doniger's approach
continues to raise questions: Which bottom (or
whose?), and what kind of up? Does one ever
really reach the bottom? The answers to the first
two questions depend, as Doniger herself
acknowledges, on the scholar as well as on the
data. If we take "the bottom" to mean the
experience and world view of practitioners
operating within a cultural-linguistic rule-game
that is different from ours, we can never get
there, no matter how nuanced our linguistic
competence, cultural-historical knowledge, or
empathic skills. Indeed, contemporary linguistic
and literary theory suggests that we can never
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truly know the referent, the thing-in-itself, in an
unmediated fashion, let alone the thing as named
and experienced by another.
Still, one can try to understand; one can try
to approximate another's meaning. One may
never gain fluency in another language, for
example, but one may gain significant ground in
getting one's (message across, or in
understanding what another is trying to tell you.
The more one understands about another person
and th~ir world-the world they are from, the
world they are in the process of constructing, the
world they imagine, and the world they imagine
you to be from-the better one's chances of
building not solipsisms, but meaningful
connection, in which one's world of meaningbuilding is influenced by another's and viceversa. Still, the question remains: how best to.
try?
The "bottom-up" method that I propose
happens to coincide with a developing trend
within academic theology called "theologies of
the people"-a growing subdiscipline that can
well serve that of comparative theology,· and
vice versa. "Theologies of the people," which
shows the influence of cultural studies, Marxist
studies and anthropology, has been defmed by
Kathryn Tanner to mean "theologies without
much textual or even extended verbal expression
which are simply found, more often than not,
fully imbedded in the religious practices and
lived relations of those who, with reference to
intellectual training, social standing, economic
attainment or institutional position, cannot be
counted among the elites of church and
society. ,,28
Tanner relies on theories of popular culture
to "flesh out" conceptually this evolving project.
Theories of popular culture, she argues, serve to
elevate the commonly ignored religious beliefs
and practices of ordinary and marginalized
peoples to a level of equal importance to
Christian theological "classics," while likewise
showing that many of the characteristics of
popular theology also hold for theologies
produced by educated and religious elites.
"Theologies of the people" therefore, when used
in conjunction with 'cultural theory, can "bring
down" traditional theology to the level of
popular theology, while "raising" popular
theology to the level traditional theology has
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thus far enjoyed. Showing all theologies to be
cultural constructions "levels" the playing field
among them.
It does not, however, address the problem of
finding the "bottom." The economic bottom,
with
all
that
it
entails-illiteracy,
disenfranchisement, etc.-is no closer to the
hermeneutical bottom than the privileged,
literate bottom is. The "otherness" of the culture
in both cases remains a barrier. 29 However, by
including different economic and cultural crosssections in a study and analyzing the constructed
nature of them all, one can try to complicate
matters; one can attempt to work against reified
assumptions that either "the bottom" or "the top"
is any closer to something called "The Truth."
One can, furthermore, invite new questions for
analysis and include new voices and
perspectives in the mix. Finally, one can try to
be clear about (or figure out) one's own
standpoint in the process.
Philosophy as a tool to this project is less
relevant than, say, anthropology, cultural studies
or the human and social sciences in generaL Yet
ethnographic approaches have not been widely
applied to the comparative theological fieldwhich is paradoxical, considering the long
tradition of ethnography in the history of
religions. One of the reasons for this lack is the
tendency within theology to consider texts, not
people, as authoritative sources for theological
reflection. One could trace in this tendency an
aversion, imbedded within the power structures
of many traditions, to recognize sources of
"revelation" or authority outside the power
centers of that tradition-as in the discourses of
people on the margins, for example, who may
have controversial things to say about a given
tradition, or who engage in practices that may
not be conside~ed orthodox.
And yet, to remain viable and relevant-in
fact, to continue to exist at all-theology as
produced by educated elites has also always
attempted at least some popular appeaL
Theologies of classically trained clergy were
directed, from the very beginnings of
Christianity, to a very wide audience.
Theologians today are as aware of the academic
or even popular market as they are, perhaps, of
their denominational affiliation. Relying on the
cultural theory of Stuart Hall, Tanner states that
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"[j]ust as popular cultural production occurs in
and through a tensive relationship with elite
culture, so elite cultural production often exists
in and through a tensive relation with popular
culture.',3o Indeen, elite theology is parasitic,
"living off the host cultures that it finds and does
not produce.,,31 And yet, those "host cultures"
are in part parasitic of and produced by the elite
culture-in this case, elite theology. Both elite
and non-elite cultures (though recent'theories of
popular culture problematize sharp distinctions
between the two) produce and are produced in a
tension-filled relation with one another. They
exist (as we have likewise seen in our history of
comparative religion, above) only within this
relation.
As Tanner has shown, a "theologies of the
people" approach works against the notion that
theological and Christian identity must be kept
separate from accommodation with the
languages and practices of non-biblical/nontheological realms of experience. She argues
that there is no way to distinguish something
called Christian culture from the non-Christian
by virtue of its content, although biblical or
doctrinal sources may certainly clue one into
whether a culture might be called Christian. In
this light, conservative, neo-orthodox and postliberal theologies that define something called
culture (or Christian discourse) as a fixed
impermeable entity make no sense. Tanner
exposes postmodernism's effects on modem
ideas of culture through its critique of holism:
the notion that cultures are cohesive wholes held
together by shared beliefs, symbol Systems, or
rituals that have a unidirectional causal force.
Postmodern thought, with its attention to
fragments, fluidity and the constructed nature of
reality, has critiqued this idea of holism, along
with the idea that cultures are closed systems,
identical to social groups, or that the activities of
a culture are held together by the inner core
32
beliefs of its members.
Such a critique is consistent with the work
of James Clifford, an historian of anthropology
who understands culture as emergent and
contested. To Clifford, cultures and traditions
are not natural,' coherent wholes, but renegotiated ensembles of diversity. These
ensembles are not given, but made, through a
process of collective, value-laden negotiation?3
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Delwin Brown, in an article about theology and
the "new ethnography," points out the radically
theological nature of. Clifford's concept of
"refashioning" in the way that "the self... called
into question is not simply a carefully protected
professional fayade with its assorted techniques
and histories, but a person. . . . At least in
Clifford's analysis, what is subject to being torn,
negotiated, co-created,reconstructed, and
refashioned is the fabric of the whole self,
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